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Povijest Izbliza: memoarski 
zapisi 1945.-2005. 
(History Up Close: Memoirs) 
 
Prometej, Zagreb, 2006, 735 pages 
 
 Dušan Bilandžić, a researcher and an 
exceptionally prolific author, does not 
provide a detailed account of the origins 
of his Memoirs. In places where he dis-
continues them (e.g. the first half of 1984 
and almost the entire 1985, 1994, 1997 
and 1998) he calls them “diaries”. And 
indeed, his notes are dated diary-style 
over a lengthy period of time between 
1960 and 2005 (proper diary entries 
commenced only in 1966). This counters 
the claims of Bilandžić’s detractors that 
this book has been written in the “tittle-
tattle” format. Diaries are always subjec-
tive as they record private observations 
and convictions, which are not supposed 
to be shared with a broad audience, espe-
cially in the form of such a lavishly pro-
duced book.  
 Nevertheless at some point Dušan 
Bilandžić did decide to share his diaries 
(most probably various notebooks in 
which he stored his impressions of peo-
ple and times) with today’s and future 
generations. And just as well because his 
matchless choice of interlocutors and the 
situations enables us to step into the se-
cret and even the intellectual life of our 
political class – both at the time of the 
twilight of Titoism and the former Yugo-
slavia and from the period of the creation 
of the Croatian state and the ensuing con-
flicts. Of course, once he had decided to 
make his diaries public, Bilandžić un-
doubtedly edited them. To what an ex-
tent, he does not divulge. But there is 
much indirect evidence of his tampering. 
We can only surmise which entries never 
made it into the book e.g. there is almost 
no mention of his engagement in the 
NGOs e.g. the HHO (the Croatian Hel-
sinki Committee). There are other altera-
tions. Occasionally a person is not men-
tioned by their name but only by their 
initials or just as “a journalist from Za-
greb”. But then we read that this “jour-
nalist from Zagreb” in February of 1988 
elaborated on “Šuvar’s thesis that (the 
weekly) Danas (Today) adopted the ten-
ets of the Croatian spring mass move-
ment” (p. 312), which means that Bilan-
džić is being merciful to a still active 
contemporary who might have problems 
because of this gaffe from 1988. 
 If we could all be sanctioned – and as 
a matter of fact we should – for our for-
mer political stupidity or moral obtuse-
ness, our public life would look like the 
frescos of purgatory that one can see on 
the walls of our village churches in 
which a multitude of sinners simmer in 
fire and brimstone. Once we find our-
selves in the former system, that of the 
crepuscular communism (the most im-
portant part of the book), which has de-
fined us up to now and which Bilandžić 
meticulously analyzes, we become 
oblivious to the author’s contradictions 
that might lead straight to the Hades’ 
vestibule. This Caucasian chalk circle of 
Yugoslav “liberal communism” can be 
discerned in Bilandžić’s systematization 
of Bakarić’s theses of May 1964: “Sci-
ence cannot be a servant to the (Commu-
nist) Party, but if somebody stands in the 
way of social progress, we will not flinch 
from arrests” (p. 40). The message is 
clear: you can be free in everything ex-
cept the very flexible definition of the 
term “social progress”. This was the 
Achilles heel of the Yugoslav system: the 
high priests of communism knew all the 
quandaries of “social progress”; and not 
only that, they systematically and pub-
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licly blasphemed but still did not allow 
pluralist solutions, multipartism and de-
mocracy. Thus Bilandžić’s Kardelj ex-
plicitly claims that “Yugoslavia is a 
product of the imperialist epoch” and that 
it is the “project and dictate of the great 
powers, the winners of World War One, 
and not a product of centuries-long 
struggle of its peoples. As such, it is not 
and cannot become an organic and en-
during community, but only a historical 
debacle” (p. 107).  
 “Presently”, Kardelj said in 1971, six 
months before playing a central role in 
the suppression of the reformist move-
ment in Croatia “we are creating a con-
federation. After the amendments, which 
will be adopted in a month, we will try to 
preserve Yugoslavia on such principles 
until the international constellation 
changes. If this does not work out, then 
we have to give up on the idea of Yugo-
slavia. This solution would require 
enormous changes in the world”. Ac-
cording to Bilandžić, Kardelj was “the 
most radical partisan of the Croatian 
mass movement” (p. 107) He was, in-
deed, just like Bakarić, but both of them 
cultivated their sympathizers within the 
political apparatus and never by means of 
mobilization and democracy. Bilandžić is 
aware of this and that is why in some 
parts of his book his growing frustration 
bursts through: Kardelj “knows not 
where he is going and how to bring that 
about” (p. 128). Kardelj’s theory is 
“hatched by a sick mind” (p. 134), while 
Bakarić’s insistence on the factor of 
“time” makes him pathetic (p. 164), and 
so on. 
 Bilandžić’s entry for 28 January 
1980 is representative: “From 22 to 27 
September 1980 I am participating in the 
international symposium “Socialism in 
the world”. Hearing more or less ideolo-
gized stories. But as usual I am making 
use of the presence of a number of politi-
cians and intellectuals and am writing 
down these tales” (p. 206). And this is 
the content of these Memoirs, with its 
boswellian plots from the buffets of so-
cialism’s gurus – also an important job. 
The feuds Bakarić-Špiljak, or Špiljak-
Šuvar, to mention only a couple, the de-
bates about the Russian interest, daunting 
even when there is none (Boško Biljego-
vić: “Tito always used to scare us with 
Russians”, p. 219), the fear of national-
ism yet its adoption as an ideological-
political orientation as it was a much 
smaller threat for our political class than 
liberal democracy (Šiljegović is “afraid 
of the spread of nationalism that might 
misuse democratic initiatives”, p. 220), 
are only a part of this rich collection, that 
evokes better than any book known to me 
(perhaps with the exception of Draža 
Marković’s memoirs) the world of our 
former nomenclature. 
 The big challenge for me as an out-
sider is a rather high level of cynicism of 
all these countless children of the revo-
lution and the relatively negligible faith 
in the system’s inherent strength. It 
seems as if nobody believed in socialism 
and Yugoslavia. The system subsisted on 
the eroded faith and the fear of pluralism. 
This makes the argument of the leftist 
intellectuals such as Leon Geršković 
even more painful to read: “Liberalism as 
a worldview has been restored in the 
form of the spread of self-management 
by means of the free association of work-
ers in factories, the free association of 
factories into big systems, the free ac-
commodation among the republics of the 
federation … When a company creates 
its business policy, participates in cul-
tural policy by financing culture, or is in-
volved in health-care policy by financing 
health-care, in research policy by finan-
cially supporting science, and so on, isn’t 
all this liberalism? Also, liberalism is 
when workers in their own factories can 
solve their housing problems and the 
education of their children, even at the 
level of high schools and faculties. The 
same applies to the assumption that 
workers may create high politics, from 
the local and the republican to the federal 
level. But this system is undermined by a 
mole called interest, a nightmare in 
which the power of technomanagers is 
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uncontrollably burgeoning, which means 
that on the basis of such commodity pro-
duction capitalism is being restored” (p. 
210). This sort of the fear of freedom is 
the deep root of our lagging, our populist 
paternalism and the rule of reactionary 
oligarchies – political, intellectual, reli-
gious – in the present-day Croatia. 
 The less important section of Bilan-
džić’s notes is about the period following 
the change of power in 1990, most 
probably because that period, despite all 
its entanglements, was nevertheless more 
open and transparent than the previous 
one. The loneliness of power holders is 
obvious here, too. It is clear that an array 
of people from Tudjman’s inner circle 
(Jarnjak, Valentić, Bobetko, Gregurić, 
Reljić) with whom Bilandžić communi-
cated were not “toeing the line”. But 
even in this, the opportunistic line from 
the communist times is at work. At the 
beginning of January 1997, Reljić asked 
Bilandžić: “Based on your political ex-
perience, is it high time I distanced my-
self from that (Tudjman’s) coterie be-
cause, among other things, I expect the 
ruling party to lose the elections?” Bilan-
džić advised him not to get out of the 
structures because from his position he 
can be of the benefit to the society and 
recommended to Reljić to continue to 
talk and even communicate with the op-
position (p. 487). In fact, Bilandžić 
praises the “Croatian tradition – better sit 
tight and not provoke an opponent, in 
this case the regime itself” (p. 523), 
which he calls the “Maček-Bakarić pol-
icy”, and condemns “the adventurous 
minority that provokes conflicts” (p. 
524). Though in this context he mentions 
Tudjman and Veselica during commu-
nism, it is no coincidence that in his 
notes there is no mention of the extrapar-
liamentary opposition of the 1990s (the 
HHO, the independent intellectuals, The 
Feral Tribune, etc). 
 At this point we should mention Bi-
landžić’ entries for April 1991 regarding 
the carving up of Bosnia, the entries that 
provoked so many comments, mostly of 
the politicking kind. I do not believe that 
Bilandžić was instrumental in Tudjman’s 
policy of the division of Bosnia. On the 
contrary, people like him, always work-
ing from within “the structures”, to a 
certain extent try to prevent the worst as-
pects of all perverse politics – communist 
or Tudjman’s. Bilandžić played the role 
of Maxim Litvinov, the man who “sub-
vert the mission” from within. Just as 
Litvinov from the Moscow Ministry of 
the Interior at the end of the war warned 
western diplomats that the Soviet boot 
would stop only when its advance is 
halted, Bilandžić also dragged his feet, 
both with Tudjman and with Kosta Mi-
hajlović. This cannot be called “stooping 
too low”. Pity he could not do much 
more. 
 Nevertheless, there is the other side 
to the coin. Bilandžić truly believes that 
one should not overdo things, either in 
good deeds or in good policies. He con-
fesses that when giving testimony before 
the Hague Tribunal in September of 1998 
he “withheld the information (…) that 
President Tudjman had instructed us how 
to work on the division of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina in order to extend the Croa-
tian territorial borders saying that an 
agreement with Serbia on that was possi-
ble” (p. 492). That is why he has sym-
pathy for Račan’s opportunist politics. 
“Račan thinks (10 December 1993) that 
it is still not wise to suggest to the 
masses to oppose (Tudjman’s) policy in 
BiH, though it is going to have disastrous 
consequences for Croatia. He thinks that 
his party (SDP) should not be drawn into 
the opposition to that politics; just the 
contrary, he has been ‘cooling down’ the 
hot heads in his party who have been ad-
vocating a more active involvement in 
this. Anyway, the HDZ should drain the 
‘glass of poison’, and only after they 
have been completely discredited will it 
be possible to take some action” (p. 428). 
Perhaps “withholding” is easier “not do-
ing”.  
 Finally, Bilandžić says: “Only des-
perate people, adventurers, risk-takers, 
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mythomanes, barbarians and bigoted 
anticommunists could in their folly as-
sault the existing Yugoslav system and 
the world order” (p. 698). This invoca-
tion of the world order is the present-day 
form of the apology of Titoism. The 
irony lies in the fact that such thinking, 
with minimal modifications, would pre-
vent the “desperate” and “adventurous” 
assault of a young man from Maljkovo 
and Feričanci who joined the partisan re-
sistance movement in 1941. People, 
Julius Caesar said, always believe what 
suits them. The systems are just frames – 
better or worse. They facilitate or hinder 
the progress of honour. Perhaps it was 
not very easy to live honourably with 
Tito but it is much worse to live dishon-
ourably in the soft times of pluralism. 
These semi-memoirs are an excellent 
source and subject of thinking about our 
time. They will teach the future genera-
tions much about these perplexing his-
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Mogućnosti političkoga: preko 
građanina ka čovjeku 
(Possibilities of the Political. Via 
the Citizen towards the Man) 
 
Disput, Zagreb, 2006, 284 pages 
 
 The book Possibilities of the Politi-
cal is the crown of many years of re-
search carried out by the distinguished 
political scientist Dragutin Lalović, pro-
fessor at the Faculty of Political Science 
in Zagreb. The tackling of Rousseau’s 
political thought lies in the focus of 
Lalović’s scientific interest. Initially, a 
professional engagement, it has long 
since evolved into a first-rate intellectual 
challenge. The outcome is a theoretical 
reconstruction of the general will as the 
central concept of Rousseau’s political 
theory. In its genetic-diachronic aspect, 
the reconstruction examines the 17th and 
18th century tradition of French political 
and ethical philosophy. The said tradition 
encompasses a gradual transformation of 
the general will from a theological idea 
into an operative concept of political the-
ory. In its systematic-synchronic aspect, 
the issue of the general will’s meaning is 
addressed within the framework of the 
conceptual field of Rousseau’s theory of 
the State. 
 The author finds the underlying ge-
nealogy of the general will concept in 
Nicolas Malebranche’s metaphysical 
system of rationalist theology. Malebran-
che’s apprehension of the nature of di-
vine justice is based on a strict gen-
eral/particular dichotomy; he shows that 
activity through particular wills is not in 
harmony with the determination of God 
as an infinitely perfect being. Just as God 
maintains nature solely through his gen-
eral wills in accordance with the general 
laws that he himself established, he can – 
in his grace – have but a general will to 
the salvation of all. The justice of God’s 
activity, however, is not guaranteed by 
the formal generality of the law accord-
ing to which he acts, but by the accord 
between God’s general will and the uni-
versal laws of the eternal and immutable 
moral order. 
 It is Pierre Bayle’s denial of aspira-
tions of pure reason to establish specula-
tive truths that introduced the possibility 
of secularizing Malebranche’s notion of 
God’s general will. Advocating the 
autonomy of spheres of the practical 
mind (i.e. history, morality and politics), 
Bayle played a key mediating role in the 
constitution of a new conceptual field of 
politico-juridical analysis (55). 
 This field was eventually established 
by Montesquieu, author of L’esprit des 
lois, which is “the first positive, anti-
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metaphysical system of science of the 
political in the history of the French ethi-
cal and political theory” (56). Lalović 
meticulously analyses the distribution-of-
power doctrine and shows that Montes-
quieu’s conceptual field does not trans-
form the general will into a concept of 
political theory. In Montesquieu’s 
politico-juridical analysis, the general 
will of the State, defined as any will of 
the legislator, is reduced to a descriptive-
analytical category. Such a status of the 
general will results from the absence of a 
conceptual definition of the State. The 
author, however, having scrupulously 
examined Montesquieu’s analysis of the 
English constitution, comes to the con-
clusion that it does in fact contain pre-
scriptive judgments on political law, i.e. 
universal basic principles of the constitu-
tional liberal State as a modern political 
order. Political freedom, as the purpose 
of the constitution of England, is ensured 
by the distribution of powers among 
various politico-social forces. The distri-
bution of powers implies a separation of 
the judicial power from the legislative 
and executive powers, and the restriction 
of its function to the application of laws. 
Moreover, it implies co-operation and 
mutual connection between the legisla-
tive and executive powers (with strict su-
periority of the legislative power), as 
well as a division of the former. In his 
stylized outlining of the constitution of 
England, Montesquieu puts forward a re-
quest for “emancipation of the legislative 
power from both the judicial and the ex-
ecutive powers, and its instalment as the 
sovereign power of the State” (74). The 
general will of such a State is reasonable 
and just, for it is formulated by a body 
which holds the legislative power alone, 
and is an expression of the will of the 
principal politico-social forces which 
participate in the legislative process as 
partial legislators (210). 
 We find a direct secularization of 
Malebranche’s theory of justice as gener-
ality/universality in Denis Diderot’s jus-
naturalistic conception of the general 
will. Diderot took over Malebranche’s 
particular/general dichotomy, censured 
the individual as a subject of particular 
will, and set up the general will of the 
universal society of mankind as the crite-
rion for justice. Diderot’s general will is 
not a politico-legal concept, but a regula-
tive ethical norm, for it is the “ethical 
universal will of mankind”. In the politi-
cal, its function is legitimative; the leg-
islative power of enlightened rulers must 
act as the will of all subjects (216). 
 Diderot’s article, Natural Law was 
published in the fifth volume of the En-
cyclopaedia. But the very same volume 
includes a refutation of the above-men-
tioned jusnaturalistic conception of the 
general will – namely, Rousseau’s con-
tribution, the article Political economy, in 
which he formulated his early political 
theory (1755). Lalović is the first to dis-
tinguish Rousseau’s early and mature 
political theories. He bases this distinc-
tion on alterations in the conceptual 
status of the general will. In his early po-
litical theory, Rousseau differentiates 
between two general wills: the general 
will of the political body, of the State as 
a moral person – and the general will of 
mankind. For the citizen, only the gen-
eral will of the State is a reliable criterion 
of justice. As opposed to the cosmopol-
itanism of the Enlightenment, which rests 
on the illusion of the existence of a pre-
social law as an ethical norm that would 
guarantee the rise of man into a member 
of the universal society of mankind, 
Rousseau defines justice in a legal-posi-
tivistic manner. The fundamental princi-
ples of justice are determined by laws, 
which are expressions of the general will 
as the will of each State, which, in turn, 
through its very generality, establishes 
and guarantees the citizens’ security and 
equality (97). The rule of law, which 
makes possible the establishment of the 
civil state and the transformation of man 
into citizen, is not brought about by the 
sham universalism of the Enlightenment, 
but by an orientation towards the repub-
lican ideal of “the rule of virtue, patriot-
ism and public education” (106). 
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 In his early political theory, Rous-
seau was unable to found a consistent 
new conceptual field of politico-legal 
analysis. Assessing Rousseau’s early 
definition of the general will from the 
standpoint of his mature theory, Lalović 
argues that it comprises no conceptual 
definition of the general will, which, “per 
definitionem, must be the will of all citi-
zens” (219). The general will is not de-
fined as an expression of their empirical 
wills, but rather perceived as a “meta-
empirical ethical principle”. Obviously, 
the breach with the jusnaturalistic con-
ception of the general will was not car-
ried through consistently (103). The role 
of the people is reduced to compliance to 
the general will mediated by their lead-
ers. Thus the general will is not an op-
erative concept of political theory, but a 
criterion of legitimacy: the obligation to 
submit to it depends on the guarantee of 
the citizens’ security (104). 
 The fourth and central chapter deals 
with Rousseau’s mature political theory. 
It is derived from a parallel scrutiny of 
his main systemic works: On the Social 
Contract, Principles of Political Law, 
and Emile or On Education (both 1762). 
In order to arrive at a conceptual defini-
tion of the general will, the author had to 
face the problem of grasping the struc-
ture of exposition of the Social Contract, 
i.e. the logic of the conceptual field of 
Rousseau’s theory of the State. Inter-
preting the Social Contract’s logic of ex-
position as a processual logic of differ-
entiation and equalization of the general 
will and the will of all, Lalović alters 
Rousseau’s exposition order according to 
“three logically related moments (the 
formation, the mode of activity and the 
meaning of the general will)”, on which 
the exposition of the general will theory 
is based (122). 
 The first moment of exposition is fo-
cused on the social contract whereby the 
political body is formed. In its passive 
aspect, the political body is termed “the 
State”, and in its active aspect – “the 
sovereign”. The State consists of indi-
viduals who submit themselves as sub-
jects to the laws brought by the sover-
eign, of which they are members as citi-
zens. By means of the social contract, 
wherein the identity of the sovereign’s 
general will and the will of each and 
every citizen is realized for the first time, 
a procedural type of legitimacy is estab-
lished: a legitimate political body is one 
in which subjects obey only the laws that 
– through being an expression of the sov-
ereign’s general will – are also the ex-
pression of the will of all citizens. It is 
the above mentioned identity that guar-
antees the full freedom of the individual 
in the civil state. Moreover, the social 
contract is a “legal principle according to 
which the nation as an organic commu-
nity (ethnos) constitutes itself into a sov-
ereign political body (demos)” (134). 
This self-constitution process of the peo-
ple as sovereign is made possible by the 
Legislator, who, acting as advisor to the 
sovereign people in the stage of constitu-
tion-making legislation, substantially 
determines the sovereign’s will by pro-
posing to him the fundamental or politi-
cal laws. 
 The second moment of exposition, 
i.e. the mode of activity of the general 
will, is linked with the concept of sover-
eignty. Since the general will can be ex-
pressed solely through the vote of all 
citizens on a proposed law, and the law is 
but an act of the general will, it is the 
legislative power which can belong only 
to the people. Since, however, sover-
eignty is limited by its legal nature to the 
implementation of the general will, it is, 
by the same token, the only power which 
belongs to the people that can “operate 
legitimately exclusively through laws” 
(141). A law is not a command of the 
sovereign, but a contract between the 
sovereign as the entirety of citizens and 
the State as the entirety of subjects – in 
other words, a contract into which the 
people enter with themselves. This dou-
ble generality of a law (both in terms of 
the will which creates it and in terms of 
its object) is the guarantee of its justice. 
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 The limits of sovereign power – 
which, being the source of the political 
body’s laws, is absolute – are determined 
by the limits of generalization. The citi-
zen is the one who decides on the limits 
of public regulation in the legislative 
process, in full mutuality with his fellow 
citizens. This results in a simultaneous 
establishment of a public/political sphere 
of freedom, in which man exists as a free 
citizen, and a private/non-political sphere, 
in which he enjoys his natural rights as a 
legal person. 
 The author’s key contribution to the 
comprehension of Rousseau’s political 
theory is the analysis of the third moment 
of exposition of the general will theory. 
Engaged in a critical dialogue with the 
most prominent interpretations of the 
general will (Bosanquet, Durkheim, Gur-
vitch, Masters, Philonenko, Gildin, 
Groffman/Feld), Lalović uncovers the 
meaning of the general will by interpret-
ing the logic of the political process as a 
processual logic which simultaneously 
encompasses the conceptual differentia-
tion between the general will (volonté 
générale) and the will of all (volonté de 
tous), and their equalization.  
 Lalović sums up the meaning of 
Rousseau’s remark on qualitative differ-
entiation and the possibility of quantita-
tive equalization of the two wills with the 
thesis that the “authentically constituted 
general will is always the will of all, 
while the will of all is not always the 
general will” (167). Building upon 
Philonenko’s interpretation of the general 
will as integration in the mathematical 
sense (162), the author shows that there 
is a fundamental precondition for the 
ability of the will of all, as the will of the 
majority, to express the general will: the 
citizens must vote as individuals. Only 
then are the differences between their in-
dividual standpoints (i.e. their individual 
wills) small enough to be integrated into 
the collective decision as in a large sum 
of small differences. If, on the contrary, 
the individuals vote as members of par-
tial associations (estates), the differences 
are too substantial to be integrated. Con-
sequently, the will of all, as the will of 
the majority, merely expresses the inter-
est of the strongest particular association. 
 Thus, the meaning of the political 
process is revealed as the logic of simul-
taneous generalization and individualiza-
tion of the will, whereby the citizen con-
stitutes himself through his capability of 
recognising the general will as his genu-
ine individual will. “As the fundamental 
treatise on public or political education, 
the Social Contract establishes and de-
velops the logic of the political process 
on the idea of democratic self-formation 
of the ‘given’ man (such as he is) into a 
citizen” (191). The conceptual differen-
tiation/equalization of the general will 
and the will of all sets the process’s co-
ordinates. When one views it from a dia-
chronic perspective, it becomes clear 
that, inside the process, as a result of the 
interiorization of generality in the de-
mocratic learning process (191), a “dy-
namic of transformation of the will of 
all” is in operation (192). There is a great 
deal of difference between the will of all 
at the beginning of the political process, 
and the will of all at the end of it. While 
initially the will of all is nothing more 
than the sum of particular wills focused 
on private interests, finally it is trans-
formed into the sum of wills of authentic 
citizens capable of distinguishing be-
tween their public and private wills, and, 
as such, it expresses the general will of 
the people (192). 
 Lalović concludes that Rousseau’s 
conception of the general will can ulti-
mately be interpreted as a theory of “le-
gitimacy of political authority in the de-
mocratic State” (11). In contrast to the 
emancipatory project of the constitution 
of a legitimate constitutional and democ-
ratic State, all existing governments are 
denounced as the natural state of despot-
ism (227). 
 The author discovers the emancipa-
tory potential of the political at the pin-
nacle of the political process: generality 
realized in the political is a necessary 
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prerequisite for the constitution of man 
as an autonomous moral individual, a 
subject of volonté universelle as a moral 
will to just conduct among men. Instead 
of stressing a certain cosmopolitanism 
which cannot be immediately realised, 
Rousseau points to the potential of re-
duced universality of the political (222) – 
“it is the citizen that is the mediator be-
tween man as he is and man as he ought 
to be” (233). The possibilities of the po-
litical become manifest in the unfolding 
of the tendency to overcome the eco-
nomically determined particularity and 
gradual attainment of moral universality.  
 The new categorical field of political 
theory developed by Rousseau in the fi-
nal text of the Social Contract is based 
on a differentiated identity of the general 
will and the will of all. Since the cate-
gorical framework of the secularizational 
logic – within which the general will was 
defined either as a transcendental entity 
extraneous to individuals, or as the indi-
viduals’ will determined by a superior 
regulative ethical norm – was unsuitable 
for the expression of specific features of 
the political, Rousseau abandoned it. The 
general will cannot become an operative 
concept unless the political process is 
conceived as a process of “democratic 
self-formation wherein individuals them-
selves realize the general will through 
their legislative activity” (200). 
 Through a critical examination of the 
classical text, the book Possibilities of 
the Political confronts us with the prob-
lem of the political in modernity. Lalović 
approaches the text with faith, although 
refusing to interpret it literally. Seem-
ingly unsolvable difficulties of interpre-
tation are successfully met by relying on 
the adequate comprehension of the con-
ceptual field of Rousseau’s political the-
ory. As a result, the maze of Rousseau’s 
conception of the general will is turned 
into a signpost enabling us to fathom the 
reach, limitations and possibilities of po-
litical modernity. Lalović clarifies the 
meaning of differentiated identity of the 
general will and the will of all as a theory 
of legitimacy of political authority in the 
democratic State, and, in so doing, he 
draws our attention to the cognitively 
challenging possibility of interpreting 
Rousseau’s political theory as a synthesis 
of two great lines of thought in moder-
nity – republican humanism and the jus-
naturalistic doctrine of the State (230).  
(Translated from Croatian by  
Damjan Lalović) 
 Luka Ribarević 
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Sloboda, pluralizam i 
nacionalizam: politička teorija 
Isaiaha Berlina  
(Freedom, Pluralism and 
Nationalism: The Political 
Theory of Isaiah Berlin) 
 
Biblioteka Hrvatska politologija, 
Zagreb, 2006, 152 pages 
 
 The political theory of Isaiah Berlin 
has been a lasting inspiration for many of 
the finest contemporary political think-
ers, such as John Gray and Joseph Raz, 
as well as for Stuart Hampshire and John 
Rawls. Berlin’s writing on liberty and 
value pluralism set the stage for two of 
the biggest discussions in political phi-
losophy going on since the middle of the 
20th century – the relationship between 
liberty and social justice, and the justifi-
cation of liberal political order when 
faced with the diversity of incommensur-
able moral and religious doctrines and 
ways of life. Therefore, Enes Kuleno-
vić’s book on Isaiah Berlin’s key ideas – 
liberty, pluralism and nationalism is most 
welcome for the Croatian intellectual 
community.  
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 As the title – Liberty, Pluralism and 
Nationalism – suggests, the book is di-
vided into three main parts. The first part, 
on liberty, explores and points out the 
most important issues surrounding Ber-
lin’s distinction between negative and 
positive liberty. The first chapter dis-
cusses the value of liberty, the justifica-
tion for the limits of liberty, the relation-
ship between liberty and determinism, 
and positive liberty or autonomy. Many 
of the issues are discussed through a well 
chosen illustration – the novel and the 
movie A Clockwork Orange, and its main 
character Alex, who undergoes a special 
treatment in prison and is transformed 
from a person who enjoys violence into a 
person who cannot physically stand it.  
 Negative freedom is mainly defined 
by a lack of coercion. In that sense, the 
realm in which the people can do what 
they want without interference from oth-
ers, or from the government is the realm 
of negative freedom. No matter whether 
we prevent people from or punish them 
for doing some truly horrible things; or 
we prevent them from doing benign and 
even worthy things, we limit their nega-
tive freedom. Naturally, such a starting 
point immediately opens the question: 
how and under what conditions should 
negative freedom be limited. After con-
sidering some of the most common an-
swers to that question, such as “the 
golden rule”, “the harm principle”, “Con-
stants’ holly freedoms” and finding them 
inconclusive, Kulenović sets the stage for 
Berlin’s response. How the boundary 
between freedom and political authority 
should be drawn is “a matter of argu-
ment”. Still, as Kulenović rightly ob-
serves, Berlin “does not say that the 
value of freedom is relative”, on the 
contrary, he warns that every limit we 
put on freedom should be justified with a 
very good reason (21). The discussion on 
the limits of freedom, thus, anticipates 
the arguments on value pluralism from 
the second part of the book.  
 Namely, freedom, although a great 
value, cannot encompass all the other 
valuable things in life, such as justice, 
equality, security, solidarity, happiness, 
truth, etc. Furthermore, freedom cannot 
be understood as a sole precondition for 
achieving other valuable things. This im-
portant idea of Berlin’s is instructively 
discussed through an analysis of John 
Stuart Mill’s arguments about freedom as 
a path to human creativity and flourish-
ing. The freedom to choose how we live 
without interference from others is what 
makes us human. Kulenović thus con-
cludes that if we came across somebody 
like Alex who has been deprived of this 
freedom, our reaction would not be con-
demnation, but pity, even though Alex 
has been only deprived of his choice to 
use physical violence. Thus, negative 
freedom can be exercised in monstrous 
ways, but it is freedom all the same. This 
last point is also mediated by the discus-
sion of the idea of value pluralism. Free-
dom to choose definitely is something 
that makes us human, but so are many 
other characteristically human values. 
So, the conclusion of the discussion on 
the limits of freedom is that some limits 
of our freedom are readily accepted, but 
there is also a sphere of personal freedom 
that should not be crossed except in the 
direst circumstances when other great 
human values are at stake. 
 Kulenović manages to show convinc-
ingly that Berlin was aware of the evils 
that negative freedom can lead to, espe-
cially when used to defend a laissez-faire 
market system without safety nets, edu-
cational opportunities and health care. It 
is also clear that the fact that someone is 
ignorant, uneducated, untalented and, in 
general, incapable of fulfilling his or her 
goals, does not mean that he or she lacks 
freedom. Still, it is not clear whether a 
person trapped on a desert island after a 
plane crash like Tom Hanks (as Chuck 
Noland) is in Cast Away is a free person. 
Kulenović suggests that negative free-
dom is defined not through the actual 
situation that we are in, but by the means 
through which we got into such a situa-
tion in the first place (14). It is not obvi-
ous that our judgement on whether Tom 
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Hanks is free on that desert island really 
depends on who flew the plane and 
whether the pilot was responsible for the 
plane crash or not. In the movie Hanks 
manages to get off the island, but in case 
he did not and died there, would we say 
he died as a free man? Another answer 
that Kulenović offers would be that 
Hanks was free, but that freedom was of 
no value to him since he did not have the 
means to make use of it. He was free to 
leave the island but had neither a ship nor 
a plane to do so. As Kulenović rightly 
observes, Berlin himself admits that the 
level of freedom in society depends on 
the number and quality of options open 
to us, as well as the importance of those 
options in fulfilling our life plans (22). 
Thus, negative freedom is an issue only 
in a society and not in Robinson Crusoe-
type of situations, but the question about 
the relationship between freedom and the 
opportunities to use it is again left to ar-
guments about the relative weight of dif-
ferent values in society.  
 The distinction and the relationship 
between positive and negative freedom 
also includes a discussion on Rousseau 
and Kant. Here Kulenović presents one 
of the main points on Berlin’s distinction 
between negative and positive freedom 
as two different values that cannot be re-
duced to the same notion. No matter how 
impressive Rousseau’s and Kant’s at-
tempts to show that the realisation of 
autonomy and self-government does not 
imply a loss of freedom are, Kulenović 
demonstrates that it is important to keep 
the analytical distinction between the two 
kinds of freedom, since it helps us recog-
nize when freedom is perverted and 
turned into its own opposite. The upshot 
of this discussion is that being free to 
choose only if the choice can be equally 
good for everybody does not seem like 
real freedom at all (55).  
 As noted, pluralism seems to be the 
key idea in Berlin’s political thought. 
Pluralism illuminates the distinction be-
tween negative and positive freedom, as 
well as the discussion on nationalism. 
The second chapter is thus central in get-
ting “the big picture” of Berlin’s political 
theory. Again, through very well chosen 
examples from the movie Mission and 
Sophocles’s plays, a distinction is made 
among the different tragic choices that 
humans are making when faced with a 
clash of different values. The chapter 
also demonstrates the influence of Vico, 
Machiavelli and Herder on Berlin’s 
thought, as well as Berlin’s debt to Ro-
manticism. As Kulenović shows, Berlin 
did define himself as an heir of the 
Enlightment, but as one ready to learn 
from its opponents, the Romantics. Be-
side the intellectual origins of Berlin’s 
value pluralism, the chapter explores the 
problematic issues of objectivity of val-
ues, the pluralist critique of monism, the 
dangers of value relativism and the rela-
tionship of pluralism and liberalism.  
 As it was predicted in the discussion 
of freedom, Berlin’s claim is that values 
do conflict and it might not be possible to 
reduce one into another or to find an 
overarching principle or value that might 
help us solve a conflict. After the discus-
sion of Berlin’s idea that the plurality and 
conflict of values are firmly grounded in 
our ethical experience (88), Kulenović 
gives an account of Berlin’s rejection of 
monism as a doctrine that presupposes 
the possibility of a unique and universal 
solution to the problem of value plural-
ism. But, as the author shows, Berlin 
does not reject the possibility of rational 
solutions to the moral and political 
problems, nor does he reject the value of 
moral and political theorizing about those 
problems. Beside their role in the analy-
sis of the coherence and logical consis-
tency of our moral and political concepts, 
philosophers (together with scientists and 
artists) are the main creators of our “con-
cepts and categories” (93). In that sense, 
Kulenović sees the contribution of Ber-
lin’s value pluralism to our awareness of 
and openness to values and worldviews 
different than our own. “The crux of 
Berlin’s pluralism”, writes Kulenović “is 
that there is nothing wrong with advo-
cating our system of values, and at the 
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same time accepting a different system of 
values as one that it is not less rational 
than ours” (94). 
 Conversely, the section on the rela-
tionship between pluralism and relativ-
ism shows that Berlin’s pluralism does 
not deny the objectivity of values. Even 
though philosophers have a lot to learn 
from ethnologists and cultural an-
thropologists and from their insight that 
different societies might have different 
views on right and wrong (99), the author 
concludes, together with Berlin, that val-
ues are grounded in the different needs 
that humans have in common. “The ar-
gument that a great number of basic val-
ues exists in societies removed in time 
and space stems from the fact that certain 
basic characteristics and needs – physio-
logical, social, emotional, intellectual and 
spiritual – are common to all humans” 
(101). It is, thus, possible to conclude 
that the upshot of Berlin’s value plural-
ism is not so much that different people 
value different things, but that all people 
have different human needs the satisfac-
tion of which gives rise to a conflict of 
values.  
 Since there is not one best way to 
solve these conflicts, it is reasonable to 
leave as much room as possible for indi-
vidual freedom of choice, as is shown in 
the concluding parts of the chapter on 
pluralism (112). The preferred political 
arrangement for Berlin is liberalism, 
even though liberalism also comes in 
some monistic varieties, as its Enlight-
ment version shows. For Berlin, liberal-
ism, “as ideology and as a system of … 
institutions can best cope with the chal-
lenges of value pluralism” (108). Still, in 
the last part of the chapter, Kulenović 
clearly demonstrates that the affinity of 
pluralism and liberalism does not erase 
the ever present possibility of tragic po-
litical choices (119).  
 The chapter on nationalism contrib-
utes to a better understanding of the rela-
tionship of liberalism, especially the idea 
of individual freedom and human rights, 
and nationalism. The values of commu-
nity and national belonging, as well as 
the values embodied in certain cultures, 
especially non-liberal cultures, are 
clearly in tension with the values of free-
dom and individual choice. Kulenović 
discusses relevant issues, such as the im-
portance of cultural belonging and na-
tional identity for personal identity and 
the relationship of cultural belonging and 
political dissent, but the most interesting 
issue is the justification of different na-
tionalist claims. Kulenović points out 
that Berlin, as one of the rare liberals 
who engaged with the problems of na-
tionalism, was well aware that national 
humiliation and ideas of cultural superi-
ority can produce powerful illiberal reac-
tions on the part of the humiliated and 
oppressed. “In the same way that an in-
dividual seeks recognition of her identity 
and authenticity, the members of a nation 
seek recognition of the uniqueness of 
their culture and a right to govern them-
selves. Military defeat, suffering injus-
tice, cultural hegemony or a patronising 
disparagement coming from neighbour-
ing nations or colonial masters lead to 
nationalist political movements” (126). 
Kulenović somewhat disagrees with this 
“bent twig theory” and argues that we 
know of nationalist movements (Catalan, 
Basque, etc.) that cannot be undeniably 
connected to a major injustice or hu-
miliation (140). Therefore, in the au-
thor’s opinion, Berlin’s ideas on nation-
alism leave too many important questions 
open. However, Berlin’s thought in gen-
eral, as the author warns us, is at its 
strongest in its questioning and rethink-
ing our “concepts and categories”. In the 
conclusion, we are once again reminded 
that Berlin questioned the ideas that 
somewhere, at the end of Time or His-
tory, at Plato’s heaven or in some other 
utopian place, all values can be realised; 
that human nature has “a lower” and “a 
higher” part and that the “higher part” 
(however defined) should dominate; the 
idea that there are timeless, certain and 
universal rational principles that can tell 
us how to live our lives without moral 
loss. (146-47) 
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 Kulenović’s book gives us a well-
written overview of Berlin’s life and po-
litical thought. The author thoughtfully 
and lucidly discusses the main theoretical 
and political issues opened by Berlin and 
shows impressive insight into the ques-
tions opened. It is, thus, a valuable con-
tribution to the study of contemporary 
liberal theory in Croatia as well as a wel-
come addition to the ongoing discussion 
of the issues opened by Berlin and the 
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European Union, Nation-state 
and Future of Democracy 
 
Hrvatski politološki razgovori 
(Croatian political science talks), 
Zagreb, 27-29 October 2006 
 
 Under the auspices of the govern-
ment of the Republic of Croatia and the 
German political foundation Hanns 
Seidel, attached to the conservative 
Christian-social Union (CSU), the Croa-
tian political science talks were held 
from 27 to 29 October 2006 in Zagreb, 
sponsored by the Croatian Political Sci-
ence Society (HPD), to mark the 40th an-
niversary of this Society, which today 
has almost 400 members. This interna-
tional conference was a part of the joint 
project of the Foundation and the HPD 
under the title European political parties 
in the European parliament. 
 The topics covered by the conference 
can be gathered from its title: The Euro-
pean Union, the nation-state and the fu-
ture of democracy. The conference inau-
gurated as its central topic the subject of 
the debates from one of the six round ta-
bles of the previous political science 
talks that marked fifteen years of democ-
racy in Croatia. Making the European 
Union the focus of political science talks 
hardly needs explanation. The European 
Union, as a politically and scientifically 
by far the most intriguing politico-eco-
nomic integrative project today, which 
by its combination of international and 
supranational elements eludes classifica-
tions of the classical theories about the 
state and the international law, as it is 
usually labelled a regime sui generis, has 
always been an interesting topic for po-
litical science discussions. However, the 
negative outcomes of last year’s refer-
enda in France and Holland on the con-
stitutional contract for the EU once more 
highlighted the problems besetting the 
Union from its beginnings. Apart from 
the oft-mentioned democratic deficit and 
the feeble legitimacy of the existing EU 
institutions, the more serious issues 
which the project of a supranational gov-
ernance such as the EU opens for the 
classical political theory are undoubtedly 
also the problems of the relationship 
between the Union and the nation-state 
and the functioning of democracy within 
a multilingual and multinational context. 
How does the nation-state, with its tradi-
tional prerogatives of sovereignty, fit into 
or should fit into the project of suprana-
tional political and economic integration 
such as the EU? Does it make sense to 
apply to the EU the concept of the con-
stitution, traditionally applied to the state 
entities in the pluralism of states? What 
are the prospects of the creation of the 
European citizenry and the European po-
litical demos regarding the existing and 
deeply-rooted national-state loyalties? In 
short, has the failure of the Constitution 
been only a temporary logjam in the 
European integration or has the nation-
state “struck back”? These issues were 
hotly and extensively debated in this con-
ference. Perhaps – as Carl Schmitt ar-
gued and later revoked – the age of state-
hood is definitely over, but the partici-
pants did not heed his injunction that one 
should not waste words on that. 
 
Politička misao, Vol. XLIII, (2006.), No. 5, pp. 147–161 159 
                                                                                                                            
 The conference was divided into two 
sections. The first, ceremonial, took 
place on the first day at the Faculty of 
Political Science, and included the guest 
appearances of the highest Croatian ex-
ecutive official and one highly-posi-
tioned European official, with all the 
trappings that go with such events: secu-
rity detail and mass attendance. The 
guests and the participants were greeted 
by Tihomir Cipek, President of the HPD, 
Ms Smiljana Leinert-Novosel, Dean of 
the Faculty of Political Science, and by 
Hans-Friedrich von Solemacher, the rep-
resentative of the Hanns Seidel Founda-
tion for Hungary, Croatia and Slovakia. 
The speakers on that day were Zvonko 
Posavec, member of the Academy, Ivo 
Sanader, Prime Minister of the Republic 
of Croatia, and Ingo Friedrich, vice-
president of the European Parliament and 
the CSU. While the prime minister and 
the vice-president of the European Par-
liament expectedly professed their faith 
in the inevitability and the smooth pro-
gress of the European integration, as well 
as the similar optimism regarding Croa-
tia’s EU membership, Posavec’s speech 
on the causes and the consequences of 
the non-passage of the European consti-
tution represented a breath of scientific 
air even in this ceremonial part. 
 The second, or the working part of 
the conference (two remaining days) took 
place in the recently redecorated 
“Tomislav’s Lodge” on Sljeme, Zagreb’s 
hiker paradise. There were the opening 
and the closing plenaries, plus four the-
matic panels and the sessions of the HPD 
sections. Though more than thirty inter-
esting papers were read, the scope of this 
brief account does not allow for all of 
them to be reviewed. Instead, the papers 
will only be listed and some of the issues 
dealt with by the participants briefly out-
lined as all the papers will be published 
in the journal Anali Hrvatskog politolo-
škog društva (The Annals of the Croatian 
Political Science Society) for 2006.  
 The opening session, The European 
constitution and European democracy, 
dealt with the topics such as the EU de-
mocratic deficit, the possible solutions 
and the prospects of creating the Euro-
pean citizenry, and the various concepts 
of democracy within the EU. The speak-
ers were: Davor Rodin (Future democ-
racy), Vladimir Vujčić (Nationalism, 
citizenry and strategies of EU integra-
tion), Damir Grubiša (Democracy in 
Europe), and the political science tandem 
from Slovenia Maja Bahor and Andrej 
Lukšič (Concepts of democracy in the 
EU). Tihomir Cipek (The EU institu-
tional design and democratic deficit) 
analyzed the concrete solutions of the in-
stitutional design for the EU, from bol-
stering the European parliament via the 
consensus-building of the corporative 
actors in the European Commission to 
the presidentialist solution and the crea-
tion of a powerful personalized executive 
at the European level. Also mentioned 
were the concrete blunders of the Euro-
pean elites that in the process of the 
creation of the constitution demonstrated 
a lack of wisdom of the American 
“Founding Fathers” (Robert Podolnjak: 
Causes of the failure of the European 
constitution).  
 In the panel The European Union in 
the media communication the topics 
were: informing the citizens about the 
EU and their perception of the EU within 
the context of the Croatian government’s 
Communicational strategy for informing, 
with the special focus on the role of the 
media in that process. The speakers were 
Zoran Tomić and Damir Jugo (The 
analysis of the communicational strate-
gies for the admission to the European 
Union by Croatia and the countries of 
the region), Marijana Grbeša, Damir Jug, 
Tomislav Staničić and Igor Vukasović 
(Media, communicational strategy and 
shaping the attitudes of Croatian citizens 
regarding the EU accession), Domagoj 
Bebić (Role of the on line media in in-
forming the Croatian public on the EU 
accession), Božo Skoko (Perception of 
the European Union in the Croatian 
public) and Monija Ivanković (Agenda-
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setting concerning the European Union 
and Croatia’s integrational process).  
 The panel Negotiations and process 
of EU accession among other things dealt 
with the role of the civil society in the 
process of the EU accession, and par-
ticularly the activities of the German po-
litical foundations in transitional coun-
tries and the policy regarding the national 
minorities in Croatia in the context of the 
accession process. The speakers were 
Jasmina Božić (Democratic monitoring 
of the accession talks with the European 
Union and the role of the civil society), 
Emanuel Galić (The Accession of the Re-
public of Croatia to the EU from the per-
spective of the policy concerning na-
tional minorities) and Aleksandra Markić 
Boban (The role of German political 
foundations in the process of the inte-
gration of Central-, East- and Southeast 
European countries into the EU).  
 The panel European policies focused 
on individual European public policies: 
the European educational policy, the EU 
“language” policies (particularly the 
analysis of the adjudication of the Euro-
pean Court of Justice in Luxembourg in 
the so-called “linguistic” cases), and the 
EU regional and the fiscal policies. The 
speakers were Ivo Žanić (EU emergence 
from the language stalemate), Tihomir 
Žiljak (European framework for national 
educational policies), Eva Klemenčić 
(Education for democracy – civic educa-
tion in the EU), Vladislav Hinšt (EU 
budget), Marko Trnski (EU’s regional 
policy) and Irena Bačlija (The Compari-
son of Competences of Slovenian and 
Croatian Regions). 
 In the panel National identity, Euro-
scepticism and democracy, the speakers 
focused on the issues of identity and bor-
ders in Europe. The marked regional per-
spective of this session was underlined 
by a thorough analysis of Euroscepticism 
in Croatia and Serbia. The speakers were 
Ljubomir Antić (NO to the European 
Constitution as the national renewal), 
Branko Dubravica (Borders of the ‘new 
states’ in the future borderless Europe), 
Uroš Pinterič and Nina Benda (National 
identity in the EU), and Nebojša Blanuša 
(Euroscepticism – the moral majority 
discourse), Đorđe Pavičević (Euroscepti-
cism and criticism of democracy in Ser-
bia) and Milan Podunavac, Dean of the 
Faculty of Political Science in Belgrade, 
who stood in for the absent Ivo Visković 
with his impromptu speech on the de-
mocratization in Serbia. 
 The closing plenary – Political sci-
ence and the Europeization – had a 
somewhat more esoteric scientific char-
acter. The speakers spoke about the Eu-
ropeization of public policy, various 
theories of integration, the place of the 
state in the political science discourse, as 
well as the difficulties in the implemen-
tation of European policies in the coun-
tries of Central and Eastern Europe. The 
speakers were Lars Johannsen (Europei-
zation and Implementation Difficulties in 
CEE), Zdravko Petak (Is the creation of 
the EU policy becoming a ‘normal sci-
ence’?), Mitja Durnik and Primož Ben 
Belak (From genesis to a complex sys-
tem: a comparative analysis of the inte-
grational processes of the EU, NAFTA, 
ASEAN and MERCOSUR), Luka Brkić 
(Decision-making and power relation-
ships: the continuous building of the 
European constitution), Ante Barišić 
(Using the concept of the state in the po-
litical science discourse on the EU and 
democracy) and Mario Sošić (Europei-
zation of national policies: the concept 
and the research approach). 
 The Croatian political science talks 
of 2006 offered a number of informative 
and topical debates, some more general 
and theoretical (as mentioned in the in-
troduction), some more thorough and 
technical, providing a detailed insight 
into certain individual policy-areas in the 
EU, its member countries and the candi-
date countries, giving a well-rounded 
political science account of the European 
Union, the nation-state and the future of 
democracy. All the speakers approached 
their subjects from today unavoidable 
comparative perspective, which was 
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manifested in the guest appearances of 
experts from abroad which gave to this 
conference an international dimension. 
The guest speakers were mainly from 
Slovenia and Serbia, the proof of com-
mendable communication and coopera-
tion of the political science communities 
in the region. 
 And finally, the conference was ex-
pertly organized. The organizers invited 
many eminent guests, e.g. the prime 
minister, and also chose an appropriate 
venue. Also worth mentioning is pleasant 
and friendly atmosphere, and socializing 
after the end of the official proceedings, 
the proof that political scientists in Croa-
tia exist not only as an epistemic com-
munity, sharing their scientific interests, 
but also as a Dionysian community, 
united in their desire for good cheer and 
companionship, as can be seen on the 
photographs available on the web site of 
the Croatian Political Science Society 
http://www.politologija.hr. 
 
Krešimir Petković 
